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On December 31, 1984, the United States withdrew
from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), a specialized agency of the United
Nations,1 one year after giving notice.' In its notice of with-
* B.A. 1982, Wesminster College; J.D. 1985, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-85.
1. UNESCO was founded in 1945 as a specialized agency of the
United Nations. As stated in Article I of the UNESCO Constitution,
The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and se-
curity by promoting collaboration among the nations through ed-
ucation, science and culture in order to further universal respect
for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fun-
damental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the
world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by
the Charter of the United Nations.
UNESCO is structured such that its programs fall within five sectors: edu-
cation, social science, natural science, culture and communication.
The UNESCO Constitution provides for an organization composed of
three organs: the General Conference, the Executive Board and the Secre-
tariat. The General Conference is composed of the member states, of
which there presently are 100. Also, there are three associate members,
one observer state and four national liberation movements with observer
status. The General Conference's main function is to "determine the poli-
cies and the main lines of work of [UNESCO]." UNESCO Constitution,
art. IV, cl. B, §2.
The Executive Board, the second organ, consists of fifty-one member
states, with the President of the General Conference sitting ex officio as an
advisor to the Board. The functions of the Board are to prepare the
agenda for the General Conference, examine the program and budget sub-
mitted by the Director-General, and ensure execution of the program
adopted by the General Conference.
The Secretariat, the final organ, consists of the Director-General and his
staff as required. The Director-General is to submit periodical reports to
the General Conference, as well as to submit a program and budget to the
Executive Board. The present Director-General, Amadou-Mahtor M'Bow
of Senegal, has held this position since 1974.
For a more detailed discussion of the structure and history of UNESCO,
see R. HOGGART, AN IDEA AND ITS SERVANTS (1978); W. LAVES & C. THOMSON,
UNESCO (1957); J. SEWELL, UNESCO AND WORLD POLITICS (1975).
2. On December 28, 1983, Secretary of State George Schultz had
sent a one year notice of withdrawal letter to Director-General M'Bow
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drawal, the United States government cited four main rea-
sons for its dissatisfaction with UNESCO: 1) increased
politicization of the agency; 2) increased emphasis on state
and collective rights versus individual rights; 3) mismanage-
ment with regard to personnel, financial activities and pro-
grams within the organization; and 4) its unrestrained
budget. The United States had hoped to provide the impetus
for improvements in the problem areas which it saw in
UNESCO, but finding the improvements in UNESCO insuffi-
cient to warrant continued U.S. participation, the United
States finally withdrew. Because the United States is a domi-
nant power and because it was the largest contributor to the
UNESCO budget,' its withdrawal from the organization will
sap the agency's ability to continue its programs.
Prior to this, the U.S. had withdrawn only once from a
UN agency: the International Labor Organization (ILO)." In
[hereinafter referred to as Schultz letter]. In the Schultz letter, the Secre-
tary of State outlined U.S. dissatisfaction with UNESCO and stated that if
these problems were not sufficiently rectified within the one year notice
period, the United States would withdraw effective December 31, 1984.
On this date, the U.S. made its withdrawal effective. For a reprint of the
Schultz letter and Director-General M'Bow's reply, see United States: With-
drawal From UNESCO, 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS (1984).
3. The United States contributed 25 percent of UNESCO's 1984-85
regular program budget, or $86.2 million. The second largest contributor
is the Soviet Union, which contributed 10.41 percent ($35.9 million) of the
budget. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
UNESCO's MANAGEMENT, PERSONNEL, FINANCIAL AND BUDGETING PRACTICES
81 (1984) [hereinafter cited as G.A.O. UNESCO report].
4. The ILO was established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles.
The formation of the ILO resulted from the belief held by many at the
Versailles Peace Conference that an organization which would concern it-
self with international labor problems need be established.
Some of the guiding principles of the ILO are freedom of association,
equal pay for equal work, and payment of adequate wages to maintain a
reasonable standard of living. Other principles embodied in the Treaty of
Versailles were that labor should not be regarded as a commodity or article
of commerce, that a eight hour day or a forty-eight hour week was
favorable, that there should be a weekly rest period of twenty four hours,
that child labor should be abolished, and that each countries should treat
all workers equitably with regard to labor. To help ensure that these eight
principles of member protection were achieved, the Treaty provided for
the establishment of an inspection system.
Not only were some of the goals of the ILO formulated at the Versailles
Peace Conference, certain leading ideas for the structure of the ILO also
originated there. It was decided that the structure of the ILO would in-
clude a general governing body as well as a secretariat. It was also thought
by those at the Conference that one of the main purposes of the ILO
would be to supervise the observation of conventions by the countries
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November of 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave
the ILO notice of the United States' intention to withdraw
from the organization if certain improvements in the United
States were not made within a two year period. As in the -no-
tice of intent to withdraw from UNESCO, the United States
cited certain problem areas in connection with its potential
withdrawal from the ILO: 1) the erosion of tripartism; 2) the
ILO's selective concern for human rights; 3) the disregard of
which had ratified those conventions. This vision of the proper function of
the ILO has materialized into one of the fundamental activities of the
ILO-that of helping to ensure application of ratified conventions by rati-
fying countries. The ILO consists of three separate organs: the ILO Con-
ference, the Governing Body and the International Labor Office. The ILO
Conference meets each June in Geneva, Switzerland. The composition of
the delegates to the ILO Conference is unique in that it is tripartite in
nature. Each member country has four delegates to the ILO Conference.
Two of the delegates represent the government while one each of the re-
maining two delegates represent workers and employers. The tripartite sys-
tem of representation helps insure that the interests of governments, work-
ers and employers are represented. The workers' delegate from the United
States has been and still is the AFL-CIO. Prior to 1978, the employers'
delegate was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Presently, the U.S. em-
ployer representative is the U.S. Council for International Business.
The ILO Conference serves many functions, the most important is its
role as a policy-maker for the ILO. In its role as policy-maker, the Confer-
ence establishes labor standards and supervises the application of those
standards by the member nations which have ratified them. The Confer-
ence is also responsible for the Budget proposed by the ILO Director-Gen-
eral, who heads the International Office.
The Governing Body is the executive Council of the ILO, which meets
three times a year. The Governing Body consists of fifty-six delegates.
Twenty-eight of the delegates are government delegates. These fourteen
workers delegates and fourteen employers delegates in the Governing
Body. Thus, like the ILO Conference, the Governing body is tripartite in
nature. Of the twenty-eight government seats, ten are permanently held by
countries considered to be of great industrial importance. The other eigh-
teen government members are elected from among countries which do not
hold a permanent seat.
The International Labor Office, the third organ of the ILO, is the secre-
tariat of the ILO. The Director-General heads the Office. The present Di-
rector-General, Francis Blanchard of France, has held this position since
1974. The work of the International Labor Office can be categorized into
three principal areas of work. First, the Office implements the many tech-
nical programs of the ILO. Second, the Office provides for various re-
gional services. Third, the Office controls and undertakes the ILO's re-
search and publication activities.
For a more detailed discussion of the history, purpose and structure of
the ILO, see A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZA-
TION (1971); D. MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ILO AND ITS
ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1969); W. GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN AMERICAN VIEW (1981).
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due process in the ILO; and 4) the increased politicization of
the ILO. As in the case with UNESCO, the United States did
not see sufficient improvements in the ILO, and effectively
withdrew on November 1, 1977.5
During the 1970's, U.S. participation in the ILO had
been criticized as ineffective and had been categorized as cri-
sis management rather than a continuous and thorough mon-
itoring of an international organization.6 In response to these
criticisms the United States intensified its involvement in and
preparation for ILO Conferences. 7  Although certain
problems existed in the ILO itself, inadequate U.S. participa-
tion in that organization had prevented effective U.S.
involvement.
The more recent withdrawal from UNESCO reveals sim-
ilar problems as those surrounding the ILO withdrawal. Al-
though the United States' involvement in UNESCO and the
ILO, and the events surrounding withdrawal from these or-
ganizations, are not identical, it is useful to utilize the ILO
experience as a framework through which to evaluate the re-
cent U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO and the future of the
U.S./UNESCO relationship. Section One of this article ex-
plores the extent of the problems in UNESCO which resulted
in the U.S. withdrawal. Section Two discusses the problems
in the ILO which the United States cited as reasons for with-
drawal, and the degree to which U.S. withdrawal caused im-
provements in those areas. Section Three evaluates how
many of the problems found in UNESCO can be expected to
be rectified through withdrawal, and compares the effective-
5. Rashin, Struggle Over ILO Pullout, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at
10, col. 1.
6. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUSTAINING IMPROVED U.S.
PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION REQUIRES NEW
APPROACHES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES (1984); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEED FOR U.S.
OBJECTIVES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, REPORT TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (1977); U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, NUMEROUS IMPROVEMENTS STILL NEEDED IN MANAGING
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS (1974); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION NOT EFFECTIVELY MANAGED, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS (1970).
7. For example, a cabinet-level committee concerned with U.S. par-
ticipation in the ILO was established and the Department of Labor did an
intensive analysis of the ILO program and budget for 1982-83 in order to
suggest changes in the 1984-85 budget. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SUSTAINING IMPROVED U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR OR-
GANIZATION REQUIRES NEW APPROACHES 18 (1984).
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ness of U.S. participation in both UNESCO and the ILO, fo-
cusing on the degree of preparation necessary to participate
effectively in these organizations. Section Four then analyzes
the impact of U.S. withdrawal on each sector of UNESCO.
Finally, Section Five recommends guidelines regarding fur-
ther U.S. role in UNESCO, and the means by which the
United States may improve its effectiveness in that
organization.
I. THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO
Secretary of State George Schultz cited four problems
with the present status of UNESCO which create U.S. discon-
tent: politicization, the over emphasis on collective rights,
mismanagement, and budgetary abuse. Discussing each of
these problem areas enables us to evaluate UNESCO's suc-
cess in achieving the goals for which it was established.
A. Politicization
One of the four reasons the U.S. cited for giving notice
of withdrawal from UNESCO was the use of the organization
as a political forum.8 Although politicization will exist to
some extent in all international organizations," the State De-
partment maintained that politicization was much greater in
UNESCO than in other UN specialized agencies.10 The State
8. "At the same time, we also recognized, and expressed our strong
concern about, those pressures to divert UNESCO to politically-motivated
ends which emanated from member states, rather than from within the
organization itself . . . . We are convinced that [cooperation to achieve
UNESCO's goals outside the agency] need not be diminished by the injec-
tion of political goals beyond its scope .... "United States: Withdrawalfrom
UNESCO, supra note 2, at 221-22.
9. For example, politicization was cited as one of the reasons for
withdrawal from the ILO.
10. "Politicization in most specialized agencies is kept within accept-
able bounds by their specialized mandates. UNESCO's mandate, however,
is unusually broad and vague, as a reading of its Constitution will show. It
has therefore not been difficult to find some justification or rationale, how-
ever tenuous, for activities basically politically in purpose." STATE DEPART-
MENT, U.S/UNESCO POLICY REVIEW 58 (1984).
The language of the State Department, however, indicates that the scope
of UNESCO's duties and objectives are broader than those of other spe-
cialized agencies and thus greater politicization should be tolerated where
related to matters within its scope. Political matters wholly extraneous to
UNESCO subject matters should not- be condoned; however, the United
States should not use the greater scope of UNESCO as a springboard to
attack germane yet politically unfavorable debate or discussion.
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Department has blamed the politicization on the strong
power of the Secretariat and its African bent."'
According to the State Department, many examples of
politicization in UNESCO exist:
aid to "liberation" organizations; imbalanced disarmament
campaigns; selective anti-discrimination campaigns; the
abuse of legitimate interest in cultural preservation to at-
tack Israel, with little or no account taken of UNESCO-
sponsored reports on the issues; and the use of the General
Conference as a surrogate General Assembly for the debate
of issues for afield from UNESCO's area of concern. 2
Some of the examples listed above, however, cannot be so
clearly blamed on the UNESCO forum. For example,
UNESCO involves itself with extraneous issues of peace and
disarmament (often pro-Soviet Union) because the United
Nations General Assembly had "urged UNESCO to intensify
its efforts in the disarmament area.""3 Although the com-
plaint regarding politicization is somewhat nebulous and per-
haps not isolated to UNESCO, 4 it does have some validity. It
is unclear, however, how much U.S. withdrawal will eliminate
or reduce politicization; the problem may be better attacked
by greater participation within the organization itself.
11. Id. at 58. "The resulting system allows for the easy reflection of
the shared orientation of the Secretariat and the majority in the Organiza-
tion's program .... In giving many of UNESCO's programs a political
start, the Secretariat and its supporting majority among member states
have often ridden roughshod over minority points of view represented by
democratic countries." Id.
12. Id.
13. The criticism that UNESCO should not concern itself with peace
and disarmament issues was also raised by Gregory Newell, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for International Organization Affairs. U.S. WITHDRAWAL
FROM UNESCO: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-10 (1984) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings], at 269-70 (Statement of Edward Derwinski,
Counselor, Department of State; accompanied by Gregory Newell, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs).
14. Hearings, supra note 13, at 223-24 (Statement of Leonard R.
Sussman, Executive Director, Freedom House, New York). See also Un-
derhill, UNESCO and the American Challenge, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 381,
392 (1984) ("It seems somewhat unfair to make UNESCO the whipping
boy of this state of affairs. There is scarcely a single UN organ or special-
ized agency which is not swamped by lengthy, bitter, protracted extraneous
political debates. This applies even to regional organizations.").
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B. Human Rights
Another reason cited for U.S. dissatisfaction with
UNESCO is the apparent disregard of individual human
rights in furtherance of states rights or collective rights.1
5
For example, UNESCO devotes a considerable amount of
funds to national liberation movements. Additionally, the
United States has criticized UNESCO studies regarding the
"rights of peoples." ' This problem first arose in 1982 when
the Extraordinary General Conference approved for 1984-89
programs which would study collective peoples' rights as well
as individual human rights.1
7
Some critics of the United States' withdrawal from
UNESCO have stated that, depending on the exact scope of
"peoples' rights," there may be some justification for U.S.
concern that UNESCO is focusing too heavily on peoples'
rights.' 8 The critics, however, are even quicker to point out
that many third world, non-democratic nations feel the need
to ensure peoples' rights as well as human rights.1 The con-
cept of peoples' rights, although supported by the Soviet
Union, was not originated by them; it is of great importance
to other nations.20 Moreover, the fact that UNESCO pro-
grams discuss peoples' rights does not, in itself, reduce the
importance of individual human rights."1
Although this focus on peoples' rights provides a possible
legitimate criticism of some of UNESCO's programs, it
15. Other western countries have criticized the increasing impor-
tance of collective rights and the de-emphasis of individual rights in
UNESCO programs. E. Tholmann, the Swiss permanent delegate to
UNESCO, stated that "[the Swiss] have the impression that the individual
becomes increasingly subjugated to collectivism which leads to a growing
tendency of an instrumentalization of education, science, culture and com-
munication at the service of the State." Underhill, supra note 14, at 384-
85.
16. Department of State, U.S./UNESCO Policy Review, supra note
10, at 35.
17. Id.
18. Hearings, supra note 13, at 220 (Statement of Leonard R. Suss-
man, Executive Director, Freedom House, New York).
19. For example, see Hearings, supra note 21, at 321 (prepared state-
ment by Samuel De Palma, Former assistant Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization Affairs).
20. Id. "Many societies which lack our heritage of individual free-
doms, particularly those which are struggling for a national identity and a
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should also provide incentive for the United States to rejoin
UNESCO rather than stay outside the agency. The United
States can combat any movement away from concern for in-
dividual human rights by using UNESCO as a forum to advo-
cate its views. 2 The United States fears that the new concern
for peoples' rights is the Soviet Union's ploy to change the
focus of human rights discussions in UNESCO. If this fear
proves to be true, the United States serves Soviet interests
and defeats its own by remaining outside UNESCO.2"
C. Management / Organization Problems
A third weakness causing U.S. dissatisfaction with
UNESCO is the organization's structure and operation. The
State Department has strenuously criticized UNESCO for
mismanagement of UNESCO's programs. The State Depart-
ment's criticisms focus on three main problems. First, it be-
lieves that the UNESCO General Conference has failed to
fulfill its function of determining "the policies and main lines
of work." '24 Instead, argues the State Department, the Gen-
eral Conference acquiesces in fulfilling its role and allows the
strong Secretariat to perform the responsibilities of the Gen-
eral Conference.2 1 Second, the Executive Board fails ade-
22. Most important, peoples' rights, however defined, should encom-
pass individual rights. They are not mutually exclusive. The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, since 1948, has set the global standard of indi-
vidual freedom. The task now is to mesh the prerogatives of groups,
however large, with the fundamental rights of all individuals within those
groups . . . Properly understood, peoples' rights can be seen as an inte-
gral part of the democratic tradition. We should not let the implication
become accepted that because democracy begins with a consideration of
the rights, it does not recognize as essential to their expression, collective
institutions that secure these rights in a community or among communities
of many individual with necessarily conflicting rights.
Hearings, supra note 13, at 222-23 (Statement of Leonard R. Sussman,
Executive Director, Freedom House, New York).
23. As Samuel De Palma, Former Assistant Secretary of State for In-
ternational Organization Affairs stated, "I cannot see how it would be in
our interest to [withdraw from UNESCO] and leave it to others to define
such rights for future generations." Hearings, supra note 13, at 321.
24. As Secretary of State George Schultz told UNESCO Director-
General M'Bow, the U.S. government has been "concerned that trends in
the management, policy, and budget of UNESCO were detracting from the
Organization's effectiveness." United States: Withdrawal from UNESCO, supra
note 2, at 221.
25. Department of State, supra note 16, at 52-53. Many of the
problems cited by the State Department were echoed by the General Ac-
counting Office in a recent report on UNESCO. See U.S. General Account-
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quately to oversee the UNESCO program and budget pro-
posed by the Secretariat.26  This failure results in the
Secretariat's having the "last word" with regard to all ques-
tions concerning the UNESCO program and budget.27
Third, the lack of any critical or, at the least, complete infor-
mation regarding the quality and effectiveness of UNESCO's
work greatly inhibits evaluation of and improvements in the
agency's work. 8 This "wall of misinformation and illusion"
makes it difficult for member states accurately to assess how
their contributions are being used and how well the goals of
UNESCO are being achieved.
29
The State Department accurately summarized the
United States' dissatisfaction with the management of
UNESCO in its report:
UNESCO today functions in a way which, it seems
clear, would astound and disappoint its founders and those
who wrote its Constitution. Its basic institutions fulfill few
of the responsibilities intended for them, and this is particu-
larly true of the parliamentary bodies, the Executive Board
and the General Conference. Instead, UNESCO has be-
come almost entirely a creature of the Secretariat; its gov-
erning bodies lack the will, the organization, and, above all,
the information to perform their functions except in a rou-
tine, formalistic fashion. All of their decisions are prepared
for them, and the execution of those decisions is entirely
within the discretion of an executive, which is not then ac-
countable to the governing councils in any meaningful
sense. It is within this environment that the specific con-
cerns of the United States with respect to the politicization
of UNESCO, its management, its program and budget, and
the suppression of minority views must be seen.80
The State Department has also complained about 80% of
UNESCO funds being spent and 80% of UNESCO personnel
being based in Paris. 1
ing Office, Improvements Needed in UNESCO's Management, Personnel,
Financial, and Budgeting Practices, Report to the House Committee on
Science and Technology (1984) [hereinafter referred to as G.A.O.
UNESCO Report],
26. Id.
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id. at 53-54.
29. Id. at 54-55.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 56.
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D. The UNESCO Budget
The fourth major reason for U.S. dissatisfaction with
UNESCO has been its budget. One of the Reagan Adminis-
tration's policy priorities for multilateral organizations is
"[t]o implement, for the first half of the decade, a budgetary
policy of zero net program growth and significant absorption
of non-discretionary cost increases .... -82 The U.S. gov-
ernment has felt that of the U.N. specialized agencies,
UNESCO has done the least in trying to attain zero budget
growth.33 For the 1984-85 program budget, for example, the
Director-General originally proposed a budget to the Execu-
tive Board that would have resulted in a real budget growth
of 5.5 percent.3 As a conciliatory measure, the Director-
General reduced the final budget amount by $10 million,
thus making the estimated real budget growth somewhere be-
tween 3.6 to 4.3 percent."
In his response to Secretary of State Schultz's notice of
withdrawal, UNESCO Director-General M'Bow addressed
the U.S. concern for zero budget growth and UNESCO's ef-
forts to meet this concern. He stated that the budget for
1984-1985 was actually $56 million less than that for 1982-
1983, the largest reduction in the history of the United Na-
tions system. Thus, although growth in the UNESCO budget
was not totally curtailed, some effort had been made within
UNESCO to control spending.3
To summarize to this point, there is little question but
that the reasons for U.S. dissatisfaction with UNESCO are
valid. One question that needs answering, however, is
whether the best method by which the United States can
make changes is to remain outside UNESCO or whether it
should work from within the organization to alleviate the
problems. By withdrawing, the United States uses its purse
strings (25 percent of the UNESCO budget) to force im-
32. Hearings, supra note 14, at 261 (Statement of Edward J. Derwin-
ski, Counselor, Department of State).
33. According to the Department of State, other United Nations spe-
cialized agencies were better able to respond to the request for zero or
near-zero proposed budget growth. For example, the ILO had a budget
increase of 1.92 percent, the World Health Organization (WHO) had a de-
crease of 0.31 percent and the FAO had an increase of 0.5 percent.
UNESCO's program increase was 2.5 percent (real growth increase of 3.7
to 4.3 percent). See Department of State, supra note 16, at 4 (Introduction).
34. Department of State, supra note 16, at 64.
.35. G.A.O. UNESCO Report, supra note 25, at 71.
36. United States: Withdrawal from UNESCO, supra note 2, at 225.
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provements sufficient to warrant the U.S. return; UNESCO
will most likely fall into step. On the other hand, by remain-
ing a member of the agency, the U.S. would retain its voice
in shaping UNESCO's programs, as well as continue to reap
benefits.
3 7
Since the United States withdrew from UNESCO just a
few months ago, the full effect of withdrawal cannot yet be
assessed. Still it is possible to use the experience of the U.S.
withdrawal from the ILO to see what can be expected and
achieved from withdrawal, and to understand what the
United States and UNESCO need to do to bring about
changes sufficient to warrant the rejoining of UNESCO.
II. THE U.S. AND THE ILO
On November 5, 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kis-
singer sent the Director General of the ILO notice of intent
to withdraw from the ILO unless improvements were made
in four areas cited as problem areas. The four areas cited in
the Kissinger letter were the erosion of tripartism, the ILO's
selective concern for human rights, the disregard of due pro-
cess in the ILO, and the increased politicization of the ILO.
By the end of the two year notice period, improvements were
not great enough to warrant the United States to remain a
member of the ILO.
The United States' concern with ILO activities, however,
did not begin in the 1970's. Some problems existed prior to
United States' membership in the ILO, and many existed
since the Soviet Union rejoined the ILO in 1954, during the
Cold War. The level of intensity of U.S. problems with the
ILO increased in the early seventies. In 1970, for example,
Wilfred Jenks, the Director-General of the ILO, appointed a
Russian assistant Director-General, Pavel Astopenko, even
though he knew such an appointment would have serious
repercussions, especially concerning the United States. 8 Af-
ter the appointment, the House Committee on Appropria-
37. Representative Jim Leach (D. Iowa) helped put the budget issue
in perspective when he stated: "[I]t is curious to note that while the Ad-
ministration is correct in charging UNESCO with program growth, the
Administration's budget figures show an actual decline of some 13 percent
in UNESCO's 1984-85 biennium as calculated in nominal dollars.
UNESCO has done a better job in restraining its budget in the last two
years than the Reagan administration and Congress have our own." Hear-
ings,.supra note 13, at 8 (Statement of Rep. Jim Leach).
38. See generally, W. Galenson, supra note 4.
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tions held a hearing at which George Meany, then president
of the AFL-CIO, testified against U.S. financial support of
the ILO.
The hearings resulted in the decision to withhold U.S.
funds from the ILO ($3.7 million, or one half our contribu-
tion in 1970 and $7.8 million, our whole contribution in
1971). Meany and the AFL-CIO approved of such an ap-
proach, although the Executive Branch believed that the U.S.
was obligated as a member of the ILO to contribute funds.
The withholding of funds did affect the work of the
ILO, and thereafter various improvements in the ILO were
made. For example, a Mexican supported by the U.S., was
elected Chairman of the Governing Body, defeating a Soviet
candidate who had received support from some of the West-
ern European members of the Governing Body. Also, there
was a reduction in the use of the ILO as a forum for non-
labor political discussion. The United States paid the im-
pounded funds in arrears in 1976.
From 1973 to 1975 certain events occurred which
greatly troubled the US. First, at the 1973 Conference the
Arab states, along with the Communist countries and some
African countries, sought to pass a resolution condemning
Israel for racism and for violating Conventions (freedom of
association, collective bargaining, and discrimination in em-
ployment). This resolution, which failed for lack of a quo-
rum, was submitted without any formal investigation or
proven violations.
Another resolution condemning Israel for convention vi-
olations was submitted at the 1974 Conference. This time the
effort was successful. Also, the Conference refused to adopt
the report of the Committee on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations in condemning the USSR for vi-
olation of the Convention on forced labor, which it had rati-
fied. In the 1975 Conference, more occurrences caused US
disenchantment with the ILO. The most noteworthy of these
was the fact that the ILO granted the PLO observer status in
both of the Conference committees. The specific sources of
United States disenchantment with the ILO are explored
briefly as a means of placing the UNESCO withdrawal in
context.
A. Erosion of Tripartism
The structure of the ILO as a specialized agency is
unique in that not only are the governments represented, but
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the workers and employers of the member countries are also
represented. This structure, conceived when the ILO was
first established, is a basic tenet upon which the ILO is to
operate. The idea of tripartism becomes jeopardized when
the worker groups or employers are not clearly distinct from
the government. A tension naturally arises between tripart-
ism and another foundational belief of the ILO (as well as all
UN agencies): universality. As an international organization,
the ILO desires the participation of all countries, irrespective
of their economic systems.
The lack of true tripartite representation from a mem-
ber country is neither a new development nor one that has
been unique to Soviet bloc countries. The ILO Constitution
states that the workers and employers of a member country
should be represented by organizations "which are most rep-
resentative of employers or workpeople," if such organiza-
tions exist.3 9 In 1927, the problem arose for the first time
with seating a worker or employer delegate who appeared to
be merely a puppet of the government. In that year the
worker delegate from Italy was from a fascist-controlled
union. Although some members opposed seating the delegate
on the ground that the union was a mere agency of the gov-
ernment, the workers' delegate was seated.
The greatest concern over the erosion of tripartism has
arisen with regard to eastern-bloc countries, usually with spe-
cific regard to the Soviet Union. The first instance occurred
in 1937, when the Soviets sat the All Union Central Council
of Trade Unions as the workers' delegate for the first time.
The concern was even greater when the Soviet Union re-
joined the ILO in 1954. There was great dispute as to
whether worker and employer delegates should be seated
where they appear to be mere puppets of the government
rather than entities distinct from the government and truly
representative of the workers and employers of that country.
The debate concerned the workers and employers commit-
tees to the ILO Conference. The heated debate, however, re-
sulted in the seating of the Soviet-bloc delegates in these
committees. As long as totalitarian countries are repre-
sented-that is, the workers and employers of totalitarian
countries-the issue of less than true tripartism will exist.
One commentator stated that the United States' attack
on the tripartism problem came twenty years too late. Cer-
tain improvements regarding the erosion of tripartism, none-
39. Id. supra note 4, at 85.
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theless, have been made. For example, in 1979, the ILO en-
acted a provision which allowed for voting by secret ballot
under certain circumstances. Proponents of the secret ballot
believed this would relieve pressures on worker and employer
delegates to vote in accordance with the government, thus al-
lowing them to further the objectives of their constituents.4"
In the same vein, some believed the secret ballot would in-
crease the autonomy of workers and employers delegates vis-
a-vis the government delegates. In 1983, the secret ballot was
used in a few instances, the two most important being on a
plenary vote by the Conference on the adoption of the report
of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, and in the defeat of the Arab resolution
condemning Israeli government cities. Although in 1977 a
country merely had to label a delegate "worker," "em-
ployer" or "government" to satisfy the ILO constitutional re-
quirement, other steps have been taken to strengthen this
requirement.
41
B. Selective Concern for Human Rights
The second grievance was the ILO's apparent selective
concern for human rights. This concern has also been
termed the double standard, for the U.S. criticized the ILO's
excessive concern over unfair application of conventions to
non-eastern European countries. This criticism was aimed
primarily at the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc nations. The
United States believed that the ILO failed fully to explore
and criticize the Soviet-bloc nations for failing to apply con-
ventions which they had ratified. Instead, it appeared to the
U.S. and to some other countries that the focus was placed
on countries which, although they had not fully applied all
ratified conventions, had attempted to satisfy ratified conven-
tions and were willing to work with the ILO to alleviate the
remaining shortcomings.
Before discussing further the issue of selective concern
for human rights, it is helpful to delineate the process by
which the ILO decides which countries should be criticized
for their failure to ratify its conventions. Like any other
40. The amendment adopted provided for the secret ballot in the fol-
lowing instances: 1) when voting for the Conference President; 2) when a
secret ballot is requested by 90 or more delegates; 3) when a secret ballot is
requested by the chairman of a Group; or 4) when concurrent requests are
made for record and secret votes.
41. W. GALENSON, supra note 4, at 45-46.
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agency, the ILO has limited resources; it should, therefore,
focus on those violations which are most egregious and need
prompt resolution. The two conventions which the Commit-
tee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
most closely watches are the Convention on Freedom of As-
sociation (No. 87) and the Convention on Forced Labor (No.
29).42
Under Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, each member
country must report regularly to the ILO as to efforts taken
to ensure that the ratified conventions are being applied. The
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (Committee of Experts) studies the reports
and data, and then reaches conclusions regarding how the
countries are actually applying the Conventions which they
have ratified. The conclusions of the Committee of Experts
can be classified into two types: first, in its report, the Com-
mittee publishes "observations" which concern longstanding
or severe violations of conventions; second, the Committee
makes other findings in unpublished direct requests," to
which governments are to reply. The most egregious of the
observations are placed on a special list. This list indicates
those countries which have shown a "continued failure to im-
plement" the conventions and recommendations they have
ratified.
The Conference Committee on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations, tripartite in structure, stud-
ies the report of the Committee of Experts, and votes on
whether or not to accept the committee of Experts' report. If
the Conference Committee accepts the report, the countries
named in the report are formally placed on the "continued
failure to implement" list, the most serious form of censure
(short of suspension or expulsion from the ILO). The ILO
Conference must then ratify the decision or else the coun-
tries listed are not censured.
The facts illustrate certain trends with regard to the
countries placed on the "continued failure to implement"
list. Most of the countries which have been placed on the list
are small developing countries. Also, the lists from each con-
ference is usually not repetitive, and the countries on the list
are fairly well spread out among the continents. Problems
arise in this area because most countries believe in the uni-
form application of standards (i.e. conventions and recom-
mendations), whereas the Soviet-bloc countries believe other-
42. W. GALENSON, supra note 4, at 47.
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wise. The latter believes that in judging the application of
conventions and recommendations, the various legal, social
and economic aspects of each country must be taken into ac-
count-a simple uniform application disregards the various
essential characteristics of a nation.
C. Concern for Due Process
As a third reason for potential withdrawal, the Kissinger
letter cited a concern for disregard of the constitutional guar-
antees of due process. The main concern regarding due pro-
cess was that the ILO Conference and certain of the Commit-
tees were promulgating (and furthering the promulgation of)
resolutions against countries without following the procedure
mandated by the ILO Constitution.
Two occurrences at the 59th International Labor Con-
ference in 1974 best exemplify U.S. fears regarding the
ILO's move away from due process. First, the Resolutions
Committee put before the Conference plenary a "Resolution
Concerning Human and Trade Union Rights in Chile." The
proposal was published prior to the completion of the investi-
gation of Chile's record regarding freedom of association.
The United States fought the resolution in the Resolutions
Committee meeting; the Resolutions Committee, however,
passed the proposal.43 The Conference plenary adopted the
resolution, though the United States government delegation
abstained.4
Second, the Conference adopted an Anti-Israel resolu-
tion regarding that country's policy concerning racism and
free trade unions in Palestine and the occupied territories on
the West Bank of the Jordan River. The United States voiced
two main objections to the resolution: first, "previous experi-
ence in the ILO dealing with serious allegations indicated the
wisdom of using in the first instance the available procedures
. . 4; second, the resolution dealt with a problem which
was an outgrowth of a political reality, i.e., the absence of
peace in the Middle East; the subject was delicate and the
adoption of such a condemnatory resolution might disrupt
the negotiating process.
The problem of due process in ILO procedures still con-
cerns the United States. Some measures have been taken by
43. W. GALENSON, supra note 4, at 74.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 75.
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various groups, however, to amend the ILO Conference
standing orders to strengthen due process procedures regard-
ing adoption of resolutions by the Conference plenary.
D. Politicization
The fourth ILO problem area was the increased
politicization of the organization. To be sure, international
labor standards and workers' rights are to a certain extent
inherently political. The distinction must be drawn, nonethe-
less, between labor issues necessarily political and the use of
the ILO as a forum for purely political, non-labor issues.
Clearly, the problem of politicization is not unique to the
ILO. In fact, the presence of politicization has been a subject
of criticism in other U.N. specialized agencies, particularly
UNESCO.' 6
The removal of all politicization from any international
organization such as the ILO would be impossible. In its no-
tice of withdrawal letter, however, the United States ex-
pressed concern that the ILO had experienced increased
politicization. The illustration most cited to support this
statement was the anti-Israel movement within the ILO dur-
ing the 1970's. In 1975, the ILO granted observer status to
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a fact which ap-
pears to have exacerbated the "anti-Israel" movement in the
ILO.' 7
Prior to the 1970's the ILO had been used as a forum to
criticize other countries for non-labor policies.48 More re-
cently, in 1981, Communist labor delegates introduced a res-
olution regarding disarmament and social policy. Although
this resolution was criticized as being wholly extraneous to
the ILO's scope and purpose, the resolution was adopted,
with the support of the U.S. government delegation.' 9
III. EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL ON UNESCO'S PROBLEMS
A. The ILO Experience
Many professionals in the international labor field
thought that the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO was success-
ful: the secret ballot stopped, or at the least slowed down the
46. See the discussion of attempts to amend Art. 17. W. Galenson,
supra note 4, at 81-84.
47. W. GALFNSON, supra note 4, at 85.
48. Cuban and S. African apartheid policies.
49. W. GALENSON, supra note 4 at 18.
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problem of eroding tripartism, 0 The amount of politicization
in ILO debates and discussions decreased somewhat 1 ; an
anti-Israel resolution in 1978 was defeated and no such reso-
lution reappeared in 1979; and progress made regarding
amending Article 17 to screen out resolutions which violated
ILO due process provisions.
Moreover, U.S. withdrawal from the ILO precipitated a
cohesive effort among Western European countries to see
that the ILO changed sufficiently to warrant the U.S. return.
In 1980, the U.S. government was satisfied enough with
changes in the ILO to rejoin.
While changes were occurring in the ILO, the United
States was reassessing its own role. The government depart-
ments responsible for ILO activities-the Departments of La-
bor, State and Commerce-recognized the shortcomings in
their methods of preparing the U.S. delegations for ILO
Conferences. The government realized that it could not in-
c-ease its effectiveness in shaping ILO programs and policies
unless it brought about two internal changes. First, the
United States government had to establish clear objectives it
sought to achieve in the ILO. Second, in order to achieve
these goals, the government (the Labor, State and Commerce
Departments) had to increase its expertise and manpower re-
garding ILO activities. The U.S. could not succeed under the
then-existing practice of ad hoc preparation of U.S. delegates-
to the ILO.
To alleviate these internal problems, the United States
government, mainly the Department of Labor, acted to es-
tablish concrete objectives of the U.S. with regard to the
ILO. The Cabinet Level Committee on the ILO established
eleven goals of the U.S. in UNESCO. The President's Com-
mittee on the ILO, the successor of the Cabinet Level Com-
mittee, approved the objectives in 1983. The objectives con-
cern three major areas: improving the four problem areas,
improving the effectiveness of U.S. participation in the ILO,
and improving U.S. input as to the efficiency of the ILO's
programs. Also, greater effort was expended to ensure that
the specific duties of the Departments of State, Labor and
Commerce were capitalized. The Department of Labor, as a
result, has the greatest role in U.S. policy formulation for
ILO activities, such as its technical programs and the ILO
50. Id.
51. For example, the ILO Conference passed several resolutions pro-
viding for the strengthening of the ILO's tripartite system.
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program budget. The Department of Labor increased the
rigor of its study of these areas. Perhaps the best example of
a greater U.S. study is the Department of Labor's in depth
analysis of the ILO program and budget for 1982-83, with a
view to proposing and alternative program and budget for
1984-85. At the least, the Department of Labor's efforts re-
flect a different, more aggressive attitude by the U.S. Al-
though it expects the ILO and the other members to bring
improvements in the ILO, the U.S. also is working to ensure
that the ILO adequately performs its programs and func-
tions. Obviously, the rationale for actively monitoring the
ILO is not solely for the benefit of that organization; the
U.S. also wants to ensure that it is putting forth its strongest
voice to affect the ILO in ways favorable to the U.S. The best
means by which to do this is to be prepared regarding ILO
activities.
Because the United States did improve its own participa-
tion in the ILO after rejoining, it is difficult to gauge how
much of the improvement in the four problem areas resulted
from U.S. withdrawal, and consequently, twenty-five percent
of the funds for the ILO, and how much was from a more
cohesive, assertive U.S. delegation at ILO Conference since
returning. At the least, withdrawal substantively improved
the areas of U.S. discontent. When a nation, especially a lead-
ing nation like the U.S., gets so disenchanted with an agency
like the ILO that it withdraws, such an action has great
impact.
The impact of withdrawal may be even greater, or at
least the reasons given may be considered more sincere by
other nations, where the country illustrates its continued sup-
port of the basic goals sought by the international organiza-
tion. During the withdrawal period, the United States pro-
vided some funding, approximately $250,000 for a technical
program established by the ILO. The United States also ex-
hibited good faith to the ILO by its internal improvements.
In a sense, withdrawal also indicates the serious level of
U.S. disenchantment with the organization. By actually with-
drawing after giving notice, the U.S. illustrated to the ILO
that it meant business with regard to the problems it per-
ceived as clouding the ILO's work. In the ILO situation, the
withdrawal had greater impact because the U.S. had never
withdrawn from a U.N. agency before. This fact added to the
gravity with which the U.S. viewed the ILO's problems.
In summary, U.S. withdrawal provided the catalyst for
improvements in the ILO. Also, withdrawal caused the
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United States to reassess the role it had played in the ILO,
and the role it should play in that organization. Thus, the
improvements which were started while the U.S. was outside
the organization continued as the U.S. worked to have a
stronger voice in ensuring that the goals of the ILO were
sought, and that the democratic beliefs supported by the U.S.
were heard.
B. Implications of Withdrawal from UNESCO
As is illustrated by the ILO experience, U.S. withdrawal
from UNESCO will help bring about improvements in the ar-
eas of U.S. dissatisfaction. As also was true with the ILO, the
United States has illustrated its continued interest in
UNESCO. Early in 1985, the U.S. joined UNESCO as an ob-
server. Some UNESCO officials had hoped a rather sudden
change of heart in the U.S.'s position regarding UNESCO,
but no such drastic change occurred. The participation of the
U.S. as an observer does evidence U.S. good faith to see that
improvements in UNESCO are made.
Before the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO, the State De-
partment assessed continued U.S. participation in that organ-
ization, and came up with possible alternative sources for
some of the benefits the U.S. received from its membership.
If the U.S. participates in alternative but still UNESCO-re-
lated organizations, such participation may also be seen as a
strong continued interest in UNESCO activities. Other mem-
ber countries' perception of such an interest may have effect
of creating greater incentive to improve the areas of U.S. dis-
content in UNESCO.
The chance for improvements in UNESCO is enhanced
by the fact that many of the Industrial Market Economy
Countries (IMEC) feel much of the same dissatisfaction with
UNESCO as the United States. Since none of these countries
has given UNESCO notice of withdrawal, these countries will
be able to work within UNESCO to eliminate the problems.
This fact creates a tension in two ways. First, the presence of
the United States in UNESCO would enhance the ability of
the IMEC countries to bring about improvements. Second,
the fact that these countries remained members of UNESCO
even though their governments were unhappy with
UNESCO's performance may cause the U.S. to be perceived
as unwilling to work to improve UNESCO. In any regard, the
fact that other countries realize the problems of UNESCO
and are dissatisfied with them helps put greater impact on the
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U.S. withdrawal. Because of this, the organization must be
sensitive to these complaints and try to rectify the existing
shortcomings in order that more nations do not follow the
U.S. out the UNESCO door.
The United States' withdrawal will probably cause the
most rapid improvements in the area of the
budget-UNESCO must adjust to the loss of twenty-five per-
cent of its funds. Because of the decrease, the agency will
most likely be forced to follow a more restrained budget even
it the U.S. returns to the organization. Even before the U.S.
officially withdrew from UNESCO, M'Bow had worked to de-
crease the budget for 1984-85.
The amount of politicization in UNESCO can be re-
duced in the short run as well as the long run. U.S. with-
drawal did appear to reduce the amount of politicization in
the ILO. The combination of U.S. withdrawal from
UNESCO and other countries' discontent with politicization
may be as effective as was withdrawal from the ILO. It is
questionable, however, whether the United States could bet-
ter reduce the politicization in the UNESCO forum by re-
turning to the organization and voicing its opinion against
such debate. The concerns existing in the states' rights versus
individual rights complaint parallel those regarding the
politicization problem.
The one problem in UNESCO which withdrawal may
improve but not quickly eradicate is the management and op-
eration problem. Because of bureaucratic inertia, a change in
the operation of UNESCO's programs would require much
time. Elimination of this problem, if it ever occurred, would
require more time than the U.S. could afford to be outside
the organization and still have other countries expect a U.S.
return.
IV. IMPACT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO
Entirely separate from the question of whether and to
what extent U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO will bring about
adequate change in the four areas of U.S. concern in that
organization, is an equally important question: to what extent
will the United States and UNESCO lose the benefits which
arise from their mutual association? In addition to the impact
which withdrawal has on the UNESCO budget (loss of ap-
proximately 25 percent of the budget), U.S. withdrawal also
affects UNESCO's programs to the extent that American
scientists, scholars, and educators no longer contribute to the
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agency's programs. Likewise, withdrawal from UNESCO af-
fects the United States' ability to receive the benefits of these
programs, although some have argued that many of the bene-
fits may be derived from other sources.
Because of the recent nature of withdrawal, and the im-
portance of certain intangible foreign policy benefits gained
by remaining in UNESCO, it is difficult to determine the ac-
tual extent to which the U.S. and UNESCO would be de-
prived of actual benefits due to the U.S. withdrawal. By ex-
ploring the benefits formerly enjoyed in each UNESCO
sector as a result of U.S. participation in that organization,
the effect of withdrawal on UNESCO and the U.S. may be
demonstrated.
A. The Education Sector
The United States has received benefits from UNESCO's
Education Sector, its largest sector. The U.S. benefits from
this sector in its work as a clearinghouse for information re-
garding educational materials. 2 Of UNESCO's role as the
disseminator of ideas and educational materials, the State De-
partment in 1984 stated that, "it is unlikely to be duplicated
by any other source . . . . It is the principal and most au-
thoritative source of higher education statistical data world-
wide."5" UNESCO's "Education for All" program, which
seeks to eliminate illiteracy, and to improve adult education,
education for women, education in rural areas, and educa-
tional opportunities for disabled persons" has also been re-
garded as a beneficial and worthy program. 55 Although the
education sector implements some worthy programs, the U.S.
government has criticized it as being plagued by problems
52. In its U.S./UNESCO Policy Review, the State Department ana-
lyzed the problems existing in each UNESCO sector and provided alterna-
tive measures by which the United States could attain the benefits while
remaining outside UNESCO. These alternatives will be discussed and ana-
lyzed in the text that follows.
53. The Education sector's staff constitutes 22 percent of UNESCO's
staff. "The 19.5% of UNESCO's budget that goes to education compares
to 5.9% for culture, 8.8% for science and technology, 7.2% for programs
related to the human environment and its improvement, and . . .3.7% for
• ..communications." Hearings, supra note 4, at 103 (Statement of Hans
N. Weiler, Professor of Education and Political Science, Stanford
University).
54. Department of State, supra note 16, at 5.
55. Id.
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which seem to plague UNESCO on the whole."
The eventual consequences for the Education Sector of
U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO are momentous. Quite obvi-
ously, the most drastic effect to UNESCO will be the loss of
U.S. funds. Also, UNESCO may lose the benefit of its inter-
action with the American professional community:
This pool of competent [American] professionals has been,
and continues to be, an invaluable resource for the work of
organizations like UNESCO, for the recruitment of both
staff and advisory and consulting personnel. In fields as
complex as the relationship between education and the
world of work, or the optimal use of appropriate educa-
tional technology, or the evaluation of new curricula, there
is simply no substitute for solid professional compe-
tence-and this country, comparatively speaking, has an
abundance of that competence. There is thus an important
contribution to be made by this country's professional com-
munity to the quality of UNESCO's work-a contribution
which, incidentally, would in turn provide American profes-
sionals with new insights and experiences at an interna-
tional scale.
57
Withdrawal from UNESCO may also have some long
range adverse effects on education in the United States.
While certain alternatives to membership in UNESCO may
provide the United States with some of the benefits of the
Education Sector as well as those of other UNESCO sec-
tors,56 professional educators in the United States would suf-
fer losses in their relationship to educational thought and
practice in the rest of the world. To enrich education in the
United States, we must keep open international channels of
professional, educational communication. Failing to do so,
withdrawal would therefore have consequences adverse to
the interests of both the United States and UNESCO in the
56. For example, the State Department felt that the education sector
was plagued with top-heavy, ineffective management, with taking too theo-
retical of an approach in its programs, with being too slow to respond to
new currents of thought, and with having too few Americans in key deci-
sion-making positions. Department of State, supra note 16, at 7. It should
be noted that these criticisms are vague, and run more to the structure of
the sector rather than the substance of its programs.
57. Hearings, supra note 13, at 103-04 (Statement of Hans N. Wei-
ler, Professor of Education and Political Science, Stanford University) and
Department of State, supra note 16, at 5.
58. Department of State, supra note 16, at 8.
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Education Sector. 59
B. The Natural Sciences Sector
The Natural Sciences Sector provides numerous benefi-
cial technical programs and access to important scientific in-
formation; it facilitates research; it allows nations to share the
costs of international research facilities; and it provides a
much-needed opportunity for international scientific cooper-
ation.6 The negative consequences of U.S. withdrawal in-
clude the following: the possible loss of scientific information,
data bases and resources by the United States; the loss of
funds which provided lesser developed nations an opportu-
nity to establish and improve scientific research within their
own countries; the potential loss of scientific exchange with
countries which the United States maintains limited contact;
and the loss of U.S. membership in important international
scientific organizations.
Looking at the Natural Sciences Sector in isolation, the
negative consequences vastly outweigh its problems. The
State Department characterized the problems as "organiza-
tional shortcomings," such as low quality of staff, unnecessa-
59. Some notable exceptions notwithstanding, the American pro-
fessional community in education, for all its intellectual and orga-
nizational strength, is not particularly known for its international
understanding and sophistication, and I say this as somebody who,
for a major part of his life, has looked in on this country from the
outside; working in a country as rich and varied as ours makes it
easy to forget that there exist both important problems and signif-
icant ideas outside of our own boundaries. If anything, the major-
ity of my colleagues in professional education in this country need
the information and the inspiration that UNESCO can provide
more rather than less; our students, the readers of our books, and
the American public at large have a right to expect that we are, as
educators, much more conversant with, and sophisticated about,
the rich world of ideas outside of this country than,rge, we tend to
be. What I am afraid of is that a professional community which
already has a certain tendency towards insularity, ethnocentrism,
and self-sufficienty would be removed yet further from the preca-
rious and imperfect, yet remarkably effective network of commu-
nication and cooperation that UNESCO has over the years suc-
ceeded in building, especially between the rich and poor countries
of this world.
Hearings, supra note 13 at 106-07 (Statement of Haus N. Weber, Professor
of Education and Political Science, Stanford University).
60. Department of State, supra note 16, at 10, 13. See also Hearings,
supra note 13, at 177-78 (Statement of Walter A. Rosenblith, Foreign Sec-
retary, National Academy of Sciences.).
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rily high administrative costs, and other flaws which impede
the quality of UNESCO projects. Once again, these criticisms
appear to be no more than an echoing of the problems ex-
isting with the general framework of UNESCO, and go more
to structure than to substance. By withdrawing, the United
States has lost its ability to try to restructure UNESCO in or-
der to eliminate the existing bureaucratic problems. It can be
argued, and in fact is argued, that the U.S. can affect the in-
efficiencies in UNESCO most rapidly by reducing its budget
by 25 percent. By leaving UNESCO in such a fashion, the
U.S. only circumvents the problems and fails to work with
other UNESCO member states to abrogate them.
C. The Social Sciences Sector
The Social Sciences Sector will also be eventually af-
fected by the U.S. withdrawal. The United States, which has
been very active in this sector, benefits from having access to
foreign social science data and scholars, from UNESCO pub-
lications, and from social science research done in foreign
countries. The greatest loss by far, is the U.S.'s voice in for-
mulating the sector's programs and in shaping the nature of
debate with regard to these programs. On the other hand,
the United States would not lose its ability to receive
UNESCO social science publications.6" Thus, the losses to the
United States from not participating in this sector would not
be as numerous as in either the Education or Natural Sci-
ences Sectors, but would still be important.
D. The Culture Sector
The Culture Sector of UNESCO has been the most suc-
cessful Sector from the United States' perspective."2 The ma-
jor objectives of the Culture Sector's programs are 1) preser-
vation of cultural heritage; 2) promotion of culture; 3)
stimulation of intellectual and artistic activity; and 4) promo-
tion and encouragement of endogenous cultural activities.
The United States government has been satisfied with the
work of the Culture Sector, and has benefited from the re-
61. Hearings, supra note 13, at 155-58 (Statement of Harold K.
Jacobson).
62. Of the Culture Sector, the Department of State stated, "[tihere is
a high degree of compatibility between the mandates and objectives of [the
American cultural organizations] and those of UNESCO, and the United
States has long been supportive of UNESCO's activities in the fields of
preservation and conservation." Department of State, supra note 16, at 21.
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
search and training programs as well as UNESCO's financial
assistance to other international non-governmental cultural
organizations.
UNESCO's efforts in the Culture Sector also aided the
United States government in helping to enact the Historic
Preservation Act of 1966."s Prior to the passage of the Act,
American officials went to study the private and government
preservation practices in Great Britain, Germany, Poland,
France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and Czechoslova-
kia.6 The trip resulted in UNESCO's publication of a book
entitled With Heritage so Rich, which was used as support for
enacting the Act.65
Although the Culture Sector has been relatively free of
the problems that plague other UNESCO sectors, the United
States could continue participation through the non-govern-
mental international organizations to which UNESCO pres-
ently contributes. 6 The United States loses the benefit, how-
ever, of being a participant in the dialogue for international
cultural issues, for which UNESCO is the best forum. As with
every other Sector, the U.S. also loses its voice in supporting
American and western-democratic views in the cultural field's
only international forum. And although the U.S. can increase
its support as a member of some of the non-governmental in-
ternational cultural organizations, 7 it will not be eligible for
membership in others."8
63. Id.
64. Hearings, supra note 13, at 198 (Statement of Terry B. Morton,




67. UNESCO is the only world organization that deals operationally
with the cultural dimensions of socio-economic development. It will remain
the focal point for dialogue on international cultural issues, and the central
coordinating mechanism on cultural affairs and cultural policies. With-
drawal from UNESCO would mean that these central coordinating func-
tions would no longer be as easily available to the U.S. Our participation in
cultural affairs on a multilateral basis would diminish, as would our access
to data now available to our cultural and academic communities.
Department of State, supra note 16, at 26.
68. For example, withdrawal has made the U.S. ineligible to partici-
pated in the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or Restitution in Case of Illicit
Appropriation. Department of State, supra note 16, at 26.
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E. The Communications Sector
In the Communications Sector, the biggest problem
from the United States' viewpoint is also the strongest reason
why the U.S. needs to remain involved. The U.S. govern-
ment has opposed from the outset the movement by some
UNESCO member states to implement the New World Infor-
mation and Communication Order (NWICO). NWICO,
which has been a topic of great debate in UNESCO for years,
is intended to correct the imbalance of access to and dissemi-
nation of information which exists between developed and
lesser developed nations. The U.S. fears that NWICO would
impede the free flow of information between countries and
would amount to a censorship of the press and thus opposes
the Order.
Although it is questionable whether NWICO will ever
have enough support of the UNESCO member states to be
implemented, the need for the U.S.'s voice for advocating
the freedom of the press from censorship is a strong reason
for the U.S. to rejoin UNESCO. Some UNESCO critics have
argued that by remaining in UNESCO, the United States is
tacitly legitimizing "anti-Western" beliefs such as the possibil-
ity of censorship of the press or curtailment of the free flow
of information. 9 The risk that a failure to fight against pro-
posals that reduce or eliminate "Western beliefs" may cause
UNESCO to support them, however, far outweighs any risk
the U.S. runs of appearing to tacitly approve such measures.
The United States can affect neither other countries' posi-
tions nor UNESCO's positions on communication (and other)
issues on a long-range basis from outside the organization.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The full effects of the U.S. withdrawal have not been
felt, yet the U.S. must continually reassess the possible value
of rejoining UNESCO. The problem to be resolved is not
whether or not we should have withdrawn, but whether and
when we should rejoin. The U.S. may well be able to reap
many of the benefits of UNESCO outside of that organiza-
tion. In fact, the U.S. could probably receive many of these
benefits for much less than what it would contribute to
UNESCO. A strictly economic evaluation of UNESCO mem-
bership, however, would fail to consider such intangible fac-
tors as maintaining this avenue of communication with
69. Department of State, supra note 16, at 30.
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UNESCO member countries and influencing UNESCO poli-
cies and programs. Additionally, by being a member of
UNESCO, the U.S. can better combat certain problems it
sees presently existing in that organization, particularly the
amount of pure political, extraneous debate and the emphasis
on states' rights rather than on individual rights.
Although withdrawal may not have been the best
method by the United States to try to eliminate the problems
existing in UNESCO, the United States should not rejoin the
organization until some significant improvements in these ar-
eas are made. As an observer, the United States could work
to see that UNESCO seeks to improve these areas. Having
observer status would allow the U.S. a more active role in
helping to bring about reforms in UNESCO; actively seeking
to improve the situation is preferable, and to other countries
looks much better, than waiting for UNESCO and its mem-
bers to take the sole initiatives to bring about the improve-
ments. Thus, observer status could be a useful means to the
end-an improved UNESCO which the U.S. would be will-
ing to rejoin.
The United States should also work more closely with
the IMEC countries in causing positive changes in UNESCO.
The greater cooperation would help all parties involved, for
these countries have similar interests to promote in
UNESCO, and also share discontents regarding UNESCO.
Once improvements sufficient for a U.S. return are made, the
U.S. should continue cooperation with IMEC countries to en-
sure that the interests of these countries and the U.S. are
voiced clearly and responded to the UNESCO forum.
Although the U.S. should wait for some improvement in
the UNESCO problem areas, it should not wait until the
problems are eliminated. This recommendation is made for
three reasons. First, the problems will never be completely
eliminated due to the vulnerability of such an international
forum to such problems. Second, the U.S. should not use its
financial leverage to force others to bring about changes
without some U.S. help. Third, great reductions in the levels
of these shortcomings will take longer than the U.S. can af-
ford to stay out without losing a strong voice and some credi-
bility with other member countries.
As was true with the ILO experience, the United States
should return to UNESCO if there are some strong initial
improvements which illustrate, at the least, a good faith ef-
fort to eliminate the areas of U.S. discontent. By returning
the United States would demonstrate its good faith in
[Vol. I
UNESCO AND THE ILO
UNESCO. Furthermore, U.S. return at that point would also
illustrate its intention to work toward eliminating the weak-
nesses in UNESCO, rather than using its contribution money
as leverage to force others to bring about the improvements.
The ILO experience evinces another important step the
United States should take with regard to UNESCO: improv-
ing the nature of its own participation in UNESCO. Much of
the effort has been without direction, in part because the re-
sponsibilities regarding U.S. work in UNESCO are divided
among various groups, with participation coming from both
the public and private sectors. As was needed with the ILO,
the U.S. needs to establish clearly its objectives in UNESCO.
By doing so, it can better monitor the problems it sees in
UNESCO. Such increased attention to UNESCO will enable
the United States to advocate its position more effectively in
that organization.
Because of the size of its contributions and because of its
position as a world leader, the United States was an integral
part of UNESCO. Additionally, the great level of scholarship
and intellectual resources in the U.S. is greatly needed by, if
not essential to, UNESCO. The efforts of both UNESCO and
the United States are necessary to make the changes needed
to warrant a U.S. return to UNESCO. The U.S. withdrawal
has provided the catalyst for improvements in UNESCO. As
was true with the ILO experience, a U.S. return would fur-
ther increase the improvements initially brought about by
withdrawal. The U.S. and UNESCO must both work to make
the changes necessary to allow a prompt, necessary reunion.
19851

